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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

'The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah ^\k\c
Ann. ij 78-2a-5 ( 1996).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES

Issue I

Sub-Issue A

Were the trial court's findings o\' fact and conclusions of law. although not

specifically entitled as such, regarding delendant's misrepresentations ol his retirement
account and disability income, adequate so as to prevent remand when the record is

replete with evidence upon which the court relied in making its decisions'1
Sub-Issue B

Was the trial court's omission o\' specific findings ol Iact with respect lo its

acceptance o\ plaintiff's answers to defendant's first discover) request, its refusal to
modify defendant's alimony obligation, and its award of attorney fees to plaintiff
negligible so as to prevent remand when the record is replete with evidence upon which
the court relied in making its decisions'.'
Issue II

Did the trial court properly grant plaintiff's request that the answers to delendant's

first discovery request be accepted bv the court, although not filed within thirty davs o['
service, when partv attorneys hail a'ciccd answers were not due during settlement

negotiations'.'
Issue III

Was the trial court's opinion that defendant hat! misrepresented the value of his
retirement account during stipulation negotiations a sufficieni change in circumstances so
as lo justify awarding plaintiff one-half ol the additional retirement disbursement?
Issue IV

Was the trial court's opinion that defendant had misrepresented the possibility of
his receiving future disability income during stipulation negotiations a sufficient change
m circumstances so as to justify awaiding plaintiff $6,000 in alimony?
Issue V

Did the trial court properly refuse to modify defendant's alimony obligation when
he Jailed to prove that plaintiff did nol have need o( the amount of aiimonv she was
receiving, thai she was able to support herself, and that he did not have the ability to
provide support?
Issue VI

Was the trial court's failure lo lollow Rule 4-501 ( I )<B) in the granting of a
protective order a non-issue when couipliance or noncompliance wilh (he rule would nol
have allected the outcome in the case''

Issue Ml

Is delendant's argument concerning his motion for partial summary judgment a

no?:-1win w hen the record is v oid ol anv evidence that a notice lo submit was filed or that

a judgment on the motion was ever entered bv the court'.'
Issue Mil

Did the trial court properly aw aid attorney Ices lo plaintiff when its decision was
based upon evidence in the record that plaintiff had a financial need for attorney lees, that
detendant had the ability to pay. and that the requested award was reasonable.'
DETERMINATIVE RULES

Rule 9. Pleading special matters, states in pertinent part:
( b i [• m thi. nu slake, condition of Ihe maul.

In all averments c\ fraud or mistake, the

circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Malice.
intent, knowledge, and other condition of mind of a person mav be averred generally.
Utah R. Civ. P. 9ibi.

Rule 36. Request for admission, states in pertinent part:
(a ) Rct/itcs! lor Adnuwion.
( I i A partv mav serve upon anv other partv a written request tor the

admission, for purpose of the pending action only. c{ the truth o\' anv matters w1thin the
scope i^\' Rule 2b( b) set forth in the request that relate lo statements or opinions oi fact or
ol the application ol' law to I'ael. including the genuineness of anv documents described in
the request. 1 he request tor admission shall contain a notice adv ising the partv to whorn
the request is made, that pursuant to Rule 56. the matters shall be deemed admitted unless
said request is responded to within 30 davs after service of the request or within such
shoricr or longer tune as the court mav allow . . ,
i2i Each matter of which an admission is requested shall be separately set
forth. The matter is admitted unless, w ithin thirty davs after serv ice of the request, or
withm such shorter or longer times as the court mav allow, the party to vv hoin the request
is directed serv es upon the partv requesting the admission a vv ritten answ er or objection
addressed to the matter, signed bv the party or bv his attorney, but. unless the court
shortens the tunc, a defendant shall not be required to serve answers or objections before
the expiration of 45 days after serv ice i^\ the summons and complaint upon him.
(b) id tea ol admission.

\nv matter admitted under this rule is conclusively

established unless the court on molmn permits withdrawal or amendment o\ the

admission. Subject to the provisions o( Rule 16 governing amendment o\ a pretrial order,
the court may' permit withdrawal or amendment when the presenlalion of Ihe merits of the
action will be subserved thereby' and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy
the court that withdrawal o amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or
defense on the merits. Utah R. Civ. E. 36(a)( 1 ). (a)(2i. (b).

Rule 52. Findings by the court, states in pertinent part:
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jurv or with an adv isorv

jury, ihe court shall find the lads specially and slate separately lis conclusions ol" law
thereon, and judgment shall be entered pursuant to Rule 58A . . . Requests for findings of
are not necessary for purposes oi review. landings o\' fact, whether based on oral or

documentary evidence, shall nol be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given lo the opportunity of" the trial court to |udge the credibility of the witnesses.
. It will be sufficient if the findings of fact and conclusions of law are slated orallv and

recorded in open court following the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or
memorandum of decision filed bv the court. . .

(c) Waiver of findings offact and conclusions of law. Except in actions for
divorce. Imdings of fact and conclusions oi law mav be waived bv the parlies to an issue
of fad. . . Utah R. Civ. P. 52ia). (o.

Rule 4-501. Motions, states in pertinent part:

i 1)(D) \oiice lo suhniii for dt ci\ion. Upon the expirations o\' the five-dav period
to lile a reply memorandum, either party may notify the clerk lo submit the matter to court
lor decision. The notification shall be in the form of a separate written pleading and
captioned •'Notice to Submi: for Decision." The notification shall contain a certificate o\'

mailing to all parties. If nei.her pari} files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for
decision. Utah R. .kid. Administration 4 501 ( I l(D).
SI AILMENT OF THE ( ASF
Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal from Ihe trial court's modification of" a decree of divorce
Course ol ihe Proceedings.

Plaintiff filed a Verified Complaint of Divorce on April IS. 1997. (R. 5-17.1 Thi

parties executed a written stipulation regarding the issues ol their div oree. i R. 25-56. 405.) The court entered a Decree of Divorce on Mav 21. 1997. (R. 62-76, i

Plumtifl filed a Verified Petition to Modify Decree ol" Divorce in August. 199".

(R.79-S9.) Defendant also filed a petition to modify the decree on January 7. 199N. (R.
124-9.) He also filed an amendment. (R. 165-70.1

Trial was conducted on both petitions on January 14. 1999. "Ihe court entered an
"Order Modifying Decree oi Divorce" on November 22. 1999. (R. 4S5-S.)
III.

Disposition in the Court Below .
The Imal order modifying ihe decree of divorce stales in pari:
"I lav mg fully reviewed the ev idence presented at ihe January 14. I999 Bench
Trial, and having heard supplemental arguments and received supplemental
motions and memoranda, the Court finds thai a substantial change in
circumstances has occurred since the issuance oi ihe Mav 21.1 997 Decree oi

Divorce namely that a substantial change has occurred in the reported financial
circumstances and place of residence ol the parlies, and thai the former Decree
was based on misrepresentations made by Defendant regarding his finances." (R.
4N5-S.)

I he a Hill's order also admitted the answ ers to defendant's first discovery request,

i R. 4S~. i It Inriher awarded plamtill Sh.000 ahov e Ihe original alimony award because oi
prev iously undisclosed disability income recciv ed bv defendant; S24.555.SO. half oi the

S4s.~u7.59 previously unreported bv defendant Irom his retiremeiil program; and \6.N00
lor altoincv lees and costs associated w ith the brim:insj oi the petition lo modilv. i R. 4S6-

SI ATFMFNT OF THE FACTS

Plaintiff and defendant were married on November 10. 1973. (R. 17.) They had

live children, two of whom have been adults during ihe time period relevant to these
proceedings. (R. 16.) During, the marriage, defendant acquired a degree as a medical
doctor, and obtained licensure in Idaho. (R. 14-15.)

In early 1997. plaintiff left the parties' home in Idaho with the three minor children

and relocated to Cedar City., Utah. (R. 14.) Defendant became depressed, terminated his
employment as a physician in Idaho and relocated lo Southern Utah to be near his
children. <R. 12.) A decree of divorce was later entered on Mav 21. 1997. (R.62-7(i.)

The parlies were awarded joint legal custody ol ihe children, with plaintiff being
dcsignateil the primary custodian and defendant being awarded statutory visitaliom (R.
73-5.) The child support and alimony obligations were "subject lo judicial review ... at

any time, without the necessity of alleging, and establishing any substantial change of
material circumstances..." (R.72 5.1

Prior to Ihe divorce, sclllemein discussions were held in which defendant was

unrepresented by counsel. (R. 521.) Rplr. Tr. P. S:5-25. 9:1 -22 (Jan. 14. 1999).

Delendant was notified by plaintiff's counsel. Willurd Bishop ("Bishop"), thai in order

to

reach a settlement, it was essential for Bishop It) have a comprehensive picture of ihe
parties* financial circumstances. (R. 521.) Rplr. Tr. P. 9:2-7. Throughout the course of

Ihe marriage, plaintiff had not been well-informed oi the details {)\ the couple's finances.

(R. 521. i Rptr. Tr. P. 19:25. 20:1-3. Delendant was informed that Bishop intended to go
through a formal discovery process in which all of the information regarding the couple's
finances would be in put writing under oath. (R. 521.) Rplr. Tr. P. 9:5-7. J7:1 1-16.
Expressing his desire to resolve matters quickly and keep attorney fees minimal,

defendant persuaded Bishop lo negotiate the settlement and prepare the decree of divorce
on the same day. (R.52E) Rptr. Tr. P. 8:23-25. 9:1-16. 16:7-1 3. 17:10-16. Defendant

indicated his willingness to answer questions truthfully and provide accurate and
comprehensive information regarding the parties' finances in order lo avoid formal

discovery. (R.521.) Rptr. Tr. P. 9:7-1 1. 17:1 3-1 6.
A meeting was held on May 2. 1997. in which Bishop, plaintiff and defendant
were present. (R. 521.) Rptr. Tr. P. 9:14-18. Delendant was told that both Bishop and

plaintiff were relying entirely on him to furnish complete and accurate financial

information. (R.521.) Rptr. Tr. P. 17:17-19. 19:11-25.20:1-12.29:13-20.30:5-11.
During this discussion, the couple's finances were examined in depth. (R. 521.) Rptr. Tr.
P. 9:19-2 1. Based strictly on defendant's verbal representations of the parties' financial
circumstances, the parties then stipulated to the terms of a decree oi divorce, t R. 23-36.)
(R. 521.) Rptr. Tr. P. 17:5-19. 19:1 1-25. 20:1-12.

At the time of the settlement negotiations, defendant remained unemployed due to

his depression. (R. 33.) However, plaintiff had been informed that defendant had a

significant disability insurance policy. (R.521.) Rptr. Tr. P. 10:5-8. In order to

determine if the delendanl had a source of income from which child support and alimonv
could be paid. Bishop questioned defendant concerning disability income. (R. 521.)
Rplr. Tr. P. 14:18-25. 15:1-20. 82:5-22. 83:7-2 1.

Defendant represented lo plaintiff and Bishop thai he had made application for

disability payments, but had been turned down. (R. 88-9. 521.) Rptr. Tr. P. 10:9-1 1.

14:21-24., 29:3-7, 82:1 1-12. Bishop testified that defendant said it would not make any
difference if he reapplied because he had been told he was never going to qualify. (R.
521.) Rptr. Tr. P. 14:24-25. 15:1-10. He said he would have lo borrow money from

family or elsewhere to pay child support until he was employed. (R. 73, 521.) Rplr. Tr.
P. 15:9-15. 83:1 1-17. Defendant testified thai at the time the divorce decree was entered,

there was no anticipation that he would receive disability income. (R. 521.) Rplr. Tr. P.
83:7-10.

Based on his representations thai he had no income, nor did he contemplate

having any. other than through eventual employment, delendant was ordered to pay
plaintiff $900 per month in child support. (R. 73.) Once employed as a surgeon and/or
physician., defendant was to increase child support payments to $1,500 per month, and
begin alimony payments of $ 1,500 per month. (R. 72-3.)

In June of 1997, defendant's disability application was in fact approved. (R. 498.)

Def. Ex. #6. He began receiving payments of $5,000 per month, retroactive to May of
1997. and through February of 1998. (R. 498. 521.) Def. Ex. #6, Rplr. Tr. P. 86:2-6.

Defendant did not inform plaintiff thai he was receiving disability payments. (R. 521.)
Rptr. Tr. P. 88:14-17.

Additionally, during the settlement discussions referred to above, delendant was

asked about the value of his retirement account. (R.521.) Rptr. Tr. P. 18:20-25. He
represented the retirement account as between S I2.000-$ 14.000. and said there would be

no further deposits. (R. 87. 521.) Rptr. Tr. P. 19:1-3. 81:1 8-23. Defendant made no
mention to Bishop or plaintiff that his former employer, Blackfoot Medical Clinic, held
annual board meetings in March or April in which it determined pension plan fund

distributions based on the previous year's income. (R. 521.) Rptr. Tr. P. 107:6:25. 108:1~~!
/

.

Defendant did not have any documentation to verify his retirement information,

bin was again told that Bishop and plaintiff were relying solely on the accuracy of his
representations due to his preference to bypass formal discovery. (R. 52 El Rptr. Tr. P.
19:8-25. 20:1-12. 25:15-21. Defendant maintained that he needed the entire $12,000-

S14.000 in the account to pay the couple's outstanding debts, including Chapter 13

bankruptcy payments of $3,500 per month. (R. 31. 521.) Rptr. Tr. P. 117:13-18.
Plaintiff stipulated to award her interest in the retirement program to defendant based
strictly on his represented appraisal oi SI 2.000-$ 14.000. (R. 31. 87-8. 521.1 Rptr. Tr. P.
30:5-1 1. The value oi Ihe retirement account was in fact $60.767.59-S4S.707.59 after

early withdrawal, (R.498. 521.) Def. Ex. #6. Rptr. Tr. P. 86:16-24.

On August 11.1997, plaintiff filed a petition to modify the decree ol" divorce. (R.
79-89.). Among other things, she alleged that defendant's representations concerning the
possibilities of receiving disability income and additional retirement disbursements were
false, and that the former decree was based on such misrepresentations. (R. 87-9.) She

requested that defendant's disability income be apportioned equally between the two or be
used as a basis to increase child support and alimony, and that she be ayvarded one-half of
the additional funds in the retiremeiil account and attorney's fees. (R. 82 .87.)
Defendant's first discovery request was filed on or about October 23. 1997. (R.
101-1 1.) A moiion to compel discovery was served on plaintiff on December 2. 1997.
(R. 112-23.) Both Bishop and James M. Park ("Park"), plaintiff's former counsel,

maintain there was an understanding with defendant's attorney, Sam Draper ("Draper").
that an extension of time to answer ihe discovery requests was granted until the parties

determined thai a stipulation for settlement was nol possible. (R. 413-16.) Draper
maintains he did not agree lo such an extension. (R. 422.)

On May 1I. 1998. Park sent a letter lo Draper questioning defendant's filing of a

moiion to compel when the parties were negotiating settlement. (R. 415-16.) Draper did
not respond. (R. 415-16.) The court issued the order compelling discovery on May 18,
1998. (R. 156-7.) Plaintiff filed answers to the discovery request on July 13. 1998. (R.

418.) The determination that a stipulation for settlement was not possible was nol made
until that time. (R. 415.)

Delendanl filed a petition to modify the divorce decree on January 5. I998. ( R.

I24-9. i In his amended petition to modify, filed June 4. I99S. defendant sought to reduce
his alimony obligation. (R. 165-0. i He claimed that although he was again working as a
physician, he was making less money than he had forecasted. iR. 165.1
On October 7. 199S. delendant served a subpoena on the Bureau Manager oI the

State ol EtalTs Department ol Occupational dM Professional Licensing to testily regarding
records created as part of an investigation into his application for licensure. (R. 545-5.)
The Division hail classified the records contained in its investigative files as "protected."
(R. 549. i The Div ision filed a moiion lor a protective order on October 22. 199S. i R.
556-42.) The court, slating thai defendant had failed lo file any persuasive authority or
reasons to set aside the protected status oi the Div ision's records, granted the o\\\cr on
October 2*. 199s. <R. 575-7.)

On September 23, 1998. delendant filed a motion for partial summary judgment on
the issues ol the retirement account and the disability income. I R. 264-8. t Plaintiff

timely tiled a memorandum in opposition to winch defendant timelv replied, i R. 2~3-SO. i
The record is completely void oi any further action either on the part of the delendanl or
the plaintiff. No notice to submit w as ever filed, and no written order was entered.
Delendant now claims that the motion w as somehow denied.

A bench trial was held on January 14. 1999. (R.521.) Testimony contrary to

defendant's request for admissions was allowed, subject lo defendant's objection, i R

521.) Rplr.d'r.P. 10:4-25. II 1-15. 12:1-25. 13:1-25. 14:1-1 5 (January 1-. 1999). The

court allowed plaintit 1 to file a mcm< trandum supporting the claim that her answ ers to
defendant's discovery request be accepted by the court. (R. 417-19.) Defendant was alsi
allowed lo file a memorandum in opposition. (R. 420-5.)
The trial court then entered its "Order Modifying Decree oi Divorce." (R. 485-8.:

SUMMARY OI ARCaiMKNI

The trial court entered sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law i*i its
order modifying the parties divorce decree with respect to the issues o\' defencant's
disability income and additional retirement disbursements. It found that a substantial

change in circumstances had occurred in the reported financial circumstances of the

parties, and thai the former decree ol" divorce was based on misrepresentations bv the
defendant. Il concluded thai plaintiff was. therclore. entitled lo $6,000 additional alimony

half of defendant's retiremeiil program. Hence, remand is not necessary on these issues.
I he trial court did not enter snecif'ic findings of fact concerning its decisions to

accept plaintiff's answers to defend; nt's first discovery request, its refusal to modify

defendant's alimony obligation, and its award of attorney fees to plaintiff. Therefore,
plaintiff does not object lo icmand on these issues.

However, plaintiff maintains that the record provides ample ev idence supporting
ihe trial conn's decisions with respect to all contested issues, and remand will nol alter
the outcome in the case. Tf us. plain!iff requests, in the interest i)i judicial economy. that

this Court exercise its power to weigh the evidence in the record and substitute its own
judgment for that oi the trial court. Due regard should be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility oi the witnesses.

Delendanl contends that because plaintiff did not respond to discovery requests
within thirty davs after service, the requests for admission were deemed admitted.

However, plaintiff maintains there was a verbal agreement between party attorneys that
answers to discovery requests were not due until such time as settlement negotiations
broke down. Because the answers to the discovery requests were served timely when it
was determined settlement was not possible, they were never deemed admitted.
Therefore, the trial court did not allow plaintiff to withdraw her answers to discovery

requests, it simply validated the verbal agreement between party attorneys and accepted
her answers accordingly.

The trial court appropriately awarded plaintiff one-half of defendant's previously
undisclosed retirement account. It found thai defendant's misrepresentations amounted to
a substantial change in circumstances, and fraud was adequately plead and proven.

The trial court appropriately awarded plaintiff an additional $6,000 in alimony due
to defendant's receipt of disability income. Again, it found that defendant had
misrepresented the possibility of receiving future disability income. This established a

substantial change in circumstances and provided a compelling reason lo modify the
original decree.

The trial court properly refused to alter defendant's alimony obligation. Delendanl

lailed to prove plaintiffdid not have need of the amount of alimony she was receiving,
lhat she was able to support herself, and that he did not have the ability to provide
support.

The trial court's grant of a protective order to the Division of Occupational and
Professional Licensing did nol affect the outcome in this case. The evidence defendant

sought from the Division could only have possibly helped him establish the threshold

issue of a substantial change in circumstances. However, defendant was also required lo
prove plaintiff's lack of a need for support, her ability lo support herself, or his inability
to pay. He failed lo do so. Therefore, the trial court yvould have still refused to alter his

alimony obligation, and the grant of" the protective order is a non-issue.
Defendant's motion for partial, summary judgment was never submitted for
decision, nor is there any evidence it was ever denied. Therefore, defendant's motion for

partial summary judgment is a non-issue because this Court is not in a position to review
a decision that was never made.

And. finally, the trial court acled properly when awarding attorney fees to plaintiff,
lis decision was based upon evidence in the record that plaintiff had a financial need for

attorney fees, that delendanl had the ability to pay, and that the requested award was
reasonable.
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ARGUMENT

I. A. The trial court entered sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law with
respect to the issues of the retirement account and disability income.
Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "|ijn all actions tried
upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the facts
specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon. . . ll will be sufficient if" the

findings of fact and conclusions of law are stated orally and recorded in open court
follow ing the close of the evidence or appear in an opinion or memorandum of decision
filed by the court/* Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a). No oral findings of fact and conclusions oi
law were recorded at the close of this bench trial.

A.

Although nol specifically entitled as such, the trial court's order modifying
the parties' decree oi divorce includes findings oi fact and conclusions oi
law.

Although the trial court did not precisely entitle any portions oi its written order to
read "Eindings of Euct" and/or "Conclusions of Eavv."' both were indeed included. In its

order to modify the decree of divorce, the trial court "found" that a substantial change in
circumstances had occurred in the reported financial circumstances of the parties, and that
the former decree of divorce was based on misrepresentations made by the defendant. <R.
486-S. i Specifically, the court indicated that the misrepresentations referred to included
delendant's previously undisclosed disability income and unreported disbursements into
his retirement account. (R. 486.) These could certainly be construed as the trial courts
"findings oi fact."

The court then separately "concluded." among other things, thai due to defendant's
misrepresentations concerning his disability income and retirement account, the plaintiff
should be awarded $6,000 above the original alimony award, half of defendant's

retirement program. (R. 486-7.) Again, although not precisely entitled as such, it is not a
stretch for this Court to construe these as the trial court's "conclusions of law." thus

fulfilling the requirements of Rule 52(a).

B.

Due regard should be given to the opportunity of Ihe trial court to judge the
credibility oi the witnesses.

Rude 52(a) also provides that "|f]indings oi fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court lo judge the credibility of the
witnesses." Utah R. Civ. P. Rule 52(a). In Wilson v. Wilson, the Supreme Court of" Utah
concluded that "|t]he trial judge has considerable latitude of discretion in | equitable

divorce proceedings] and ... his judgment should not be changed lightly, and in fact, nol at
all. unless it works such a manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear abuse of
discretion." 296 P.2d 977, 981 (Utah 1956).

In the (his ease, no such clear abuse of discretion is present. The record provides
ample testimony validating the court's finding that defendant misrepresented his financial
situation during the settlement negotiations which led up to the couple's original
stipulation.

The trial court was presented with testimony that defendant was told he was being
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relied upon to tell ihe truth about the couple's financial situation, i R. 52 1. > Rptr. Tr. P.
17:17-19. 19:1 1-2/v 20:1-12. 29:15-20. 50:5-1 1 (Jan. 14. 1999). The record manifests

thai delendant made representations that Ins application lor disability income had been
denied, and that there was no possihiliiv he would receive disability income in the future.
(R.52I.I Rptr. Tr. P. 14:24-25. 15:1-10. Furthermore, the record contains testimony to

establish that defendant misrepresented the possibility of future funds being disbursed
into his retirement account. (R.521.) Rptr. Tr. P. 19:1-3.81:18-23.
.Although the record contains testimony to the contrary, due regard must be given

lo the trial court's ability lo judge the credibility ol the witnesses. In Mincer v. Mincer,
the Supreme Court oi Utah slated, "...we accord considerable deference to the judgment

ol the trial court and inlerpose our ow n judgment only where the ev idence clearly
preponderates to the contrary or the trial court abuses its discretion or misapplies
principles ol law." 706 P.2d 1060. ]002(l'tah 19S5).
When, as in this case, it is evident from the record that the trial court had

substantial cv idence upon which to base Us decisions, it is unreasonable to conclude that a
manifest injustice or inequilv occurred so as to indicate a clear abuse ol discietion. As
declared in Wilson v. Wilson, the trial court's judgment should not be changed lightly.
296 P.2d 977. 9<s I (Utah 1956). And. w hereas adequate findings oi Iact and conclusions

ol law were entered concerning defendant's misrepresentations ol his retirement 'Issue
i and disability income (Issue IV i. these issues do not require remand or a substitute

judgment of this Court.

C.

Alternatively, this Court sluuild weigh the evidence and suhslituie its own
judgment for thai of the trial court.

Should this Court conclude thai Ihe trial court did nol enter sufficient findings o\'
fad and conclusions of law so as to satisfy Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rides of Civil
Procedure with respect to the retirement account and disability income issues, it has the
power to weigh ihe evidence and substitute its own judgment for that of" the trial court.
Wilson v. Wilson. 296 P.2d 977. 981 (Utah 1956). If this occurs, this Court should enter

findings supporting the order oi the trial court due to the adequacy of the information

contained in the record and the ability of this Court to determine upon which facts the
trial judge relied in entering his judgment.

In Monlova v. Montova. the Supreme Court oi Utah stated. "|a|lthough this Court
has [lower in an equity case such as this to weigh the evidence and substitute our
judgment lor thai oi the trial court, we decline to do so where we have no means of

knowing upon which facts the trial pui^c relied in entering his judgment." 696 P.2d
I 193. I 195 (Utah I9S5) (emphasis added). The Court also noted that the record was
deficient in many critical aspects. El.

Eurthcrmore. in Parish v. Parish, ihe Supreme Courl ol" Utah declared its power n

equity eases to make findings or direct the trial court to make findings in accoixianee with
the evidence where the record is sufficieni. 55 P.2d 999. ]()()1 (Utah 1954). However.
the court found that the evidence wo ' the nature of the case were such that it should either

make tHidings or direct what Imdings should be made. UL The Irial court had entered no
finding to support its judgment, and the evidence clearly showed thai the trial court's
order was erroneous. Id. The case was remanded.

KL

Unlike the case ol Montova v. Montova. the record in the present case is not

deficient in enabling this Court to determine upon which fads the trial court relied in
entering its judgment. As referred to above, there is ample evidence in the record to

persuade this Court to enter findings oi fact and conclusions of law upholding the
judgment ol" the trial court.

I.ikew ise. the present case can be distinguished from Parish v. Parish in that there
is no evidence which clearly shows the judgment oi (he trial court to be erroneous.

Therefore, should this Court not be persuaded that sufficient findings ol fact and
conclusions of law were included in the trial court's order, it should not require remand.
Instead, this ( ourt should substitute its findings in accordance wilh the ev idence
coniained in the record, again according considerable deference to the judgment of the
trial court.

1. IE

The record is replete with evidence to support the trial court's decisions
regarding its acceptance of plaintiff's answers to defendant's first discovery
request, its refusal to modify defendant's alimony obligation, and its award of
attorney's fees to plaintiff.

Although plaintiff does not strongly object lo this Court's remand oi the three
above issues (the trial court's acceptance of plaintiff's answers lo defendant's fust
discovery request, its refusal to modily delendant's alimony obligation, and its aw aid ol

attorney's lees to plaintiff) for entry oi proper findings of fad. she is convinced it will not
alter the conclusions in this case. The record has ample supportive evidence lo

demonstrate upon which facts the trial court relied in entering Us conclusions pertaining
lo these issues.

A.

The record supports ihe trial court's decisions so as to prevent any abuse oi
discretion.

To repeal. "|t jhe trial judge has considerable latitude of discretion in | equitable
divorce proceedings! and ... his judgment should not be changed lightly, and in fad. not at
all. unless it works such a manifest injustice or inequity as to indicate a clear abus e

ol

discretion." Wilson v. Wilson. 296 P.2d 977. 9S1 (Utah 1956). Where, as here, the

record contains satisfactory evidence to support the judge's decision, there has plainly
been no clear abuse oi discretion.

I.

Evidence supports the court's acceptance oi ihe plaintiffs answers to
defendant's first discovery request.

Idle record contains the sworn affidavit iA' plaintiff's former counsel. Bishop.
declaring a verbal agreement between he and defendant's counsel. Draper. (R. 414.) The
agreement was dial during ihe parlies" settlement negotiations, plaintiff was "ranted an

indefinite extension of time lo respond to pending matters, including discovery icquests.
R.4

The record lurther contains the affidavit of plaintiff's subsequent counsel. Park,

who states it had been his understanding that answers lo the discovery requesis would not

be required until the parlies determined that a stipulation for setlleinent was not possible.
(R. 41 5. i I hat determination was not made uniil the responses lor discovery requests
were tiled, t R. 4 15.) This information was included in plaintiff's memorandum in
support of plaintiff's request thai ihe answers to delendant's first discovery request be
accepted by ihe court. (R. 417-19.)
The trial court also considered defendant's objection and memorandum in

opposition to plaintiff's request that the answers lo delendant's first discovery request be
accepted by the courl. (R. 420-5.) Rased on all of the evidence before it. the court

concluded that plaintiff's answers were admitted to the court. (R. 4S9.)
2.

Evidence supports the court's refusal lo modify defendant's alimony
obligation.

The record contains ev idence wInch demonstrates plaintiff's need for alimony and
her inability to support herself. She w as attending school full-tune, and was not working.
iR. 205. 521.) Rptr. Tr. P. 40:25. 41:1-3 iJan. 14. 1999i. She was receiving Pell ('.rants
And help from others in order to maintain herself and her two children, i R. 2o5. > She did
not hav e anv assets from which to burrow money lo support herscll. t R. 52 i. i Rptr. Tr.

P. 40:9-24. If defendant had paid the alimony oi S I500 per month as required by ihe
divorce decree, plaintiff won Id not hav e had need oi govern men 1or oilier assistance, and
could hav e properly supported herself and two children living with her. i R. 205.)
Delendant did nol show his inability to provide support. Although he claimed in
his amended petition lo modilv the decree oi divoi-ce that his gross monthly income \\;ii

$7,000, his financial declaration showed that his gross income was SI 1.666.6^ per month.
(R. 165. 226.) Even after deductions, defendant slated that his monthly is S7.554.05. and

his debts and obligations S4.700, That leaves a surplus oi S2.S54.05. In addition.
efendanl
tide

testified that at Ihe time of trial he was making even more lhan his financial

declaration had stated due to an increase in his practice. (R. 521.) Rptr. Tr. P 1-19.

Thus, delendanl did not present evidence to show that he could not meet the alimony
obligation.

Evidence supports the court's award oi attorney lees to plainti
Eirsi. there is evidence which demonstrates plaintiff's financial need for an award
of altornev fees. At trial, plaintiff was asked if she had the funds to pay the leizal fees she

had incurred as a result of ihese proceedings. (R.521.) Rplr. Tr. P. 40:5-7. She
answered that she did not. (R. 521.) Rptr. Tr. P. 40:S. She was not working at all
because she was attending school full-time. (R. 521.) Rptr. Tr. P. 40:25. 41 :l-3. She did

nol have any assets from which lo borrow to pay altornev fees. (R. 52 1.) Rpt \ Tr. P.
40:9-24.

Second, there is evidence thai defendant had the ability to pav attorney fees, lbs
gross income was in excess i)i 5 11,60b,6S per month, l R. 226. e-2 I.) Rptr. Fr. 1)

cp

Ex He stated in his financial declaration thai his debts and obligations tolalec 54.700.
R. 226.

And third, the requested award is reasonable. Nothing is said in the record or in

any allidavii claiming that the lees requested were unreasonable in amount.
P.

J'his Court should weigh the cv idence and substitute Us ow n judgment loi
that of the trial court.

riierelore. in the interest ol judicial economy, (his Court sluuild weigh the
ev idence and enter adequate findings based on the ev idence coniained in the record. Such

Imdings should therefore include: I i a finding that the party attorneys had a verbal
agreement to allow discovery requests to remain unanswered until settlement negotiations

broke down. [in support of ihe trial court's acceptance oi plaintiff's answers lo
defendant's first discovery request]; 2) a finding that the trial court's refusal to modify
defendant's alimony obligation was based on the financial condition and needs oi the
plaintil 1. her ability to support herself, and the ability oi tlefendaiil lo provide support; and
5i a finding that the trial court's decision to award attorney lees was based upon evidence
ol the plaintil Es financial need lor attorney lees, the ability of the delendant to pay. and
the reasonableness of the requested award.

IE

The trial court properly granted plaintiff's request that the answers to
defendant's first diseo\er\ request he accepted by the court because they
were ne\er deemed admitted due to an agreement between party attorneys.
Delendant contends the request for admissions should be deemed admitted because

plaintill "s answers were not filed within thirty day s after serv ice. Etah R. Civ. P.
56i an 2 i. However, plaintiff maintains that the attorneys for the parlies agreed that the
answers would not be due until it was determined that a settlement agreement could not

be negotiated.

Thus, ihe plaintiff did not ask the trial court to permit w iihdraw al oi her

admissions under Rule 36(b). Eltah R. of Civ. P. 50(b) (1999). Rather, she asked the

court to accept answers thai were not filed until settlement negotiations broke down.

The record contains Ihe sworn affidavit of plaintiffs former counsel. Bishop,
declaring a verbal agreement beiwcL n he and defendant's counsel. Diapci. (R. 4 14.) The

agreement was that during the parties' settlement negotiations, plaintiff was grained an

indefinite extension ol time to respond to [lending mailers, including discovery requests.
(R.413-14.)

The record further contains the affidavit of plaintiff s subsequent counsel. Park,

who states it had been his understanding that answers lo the discovery requests would not
he required until the parlies determined that a stipulation for settlement was not possible.

(R. 415.) ddiat determination was not made until the responses for discovery requests

were filed. (R. 415.) In fact. Park sent Draper a Idler questioning his motion lo compel
because the parties were still negotiating settlement. (R. 415.) Upon no response. Park
sent Draper another letter requesting that he respond to the letter regarding se.tlement.
(R. 415.) Again. Draper did nol respond, and Park subsequently filed the answers. (R.
415

None of the authorities cited bv defendant address the mallei' w Inch was before the

trial court. In this ease, hota the alleeneys for ihe plaintiff state there was a verbal
agreement with the defendant's attorney for an open extension ol time lo answer the
discovery requests until it was determined whether a settlement could be reached. (R.

24

41s.) It is well-known in the held ol legal practice that attorneys routinely make verbal
agreements regarding discovery which vary from the formal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Wherefore, (his is not an action in w Inch the trial court allowed the plaintiff to
w ithdraw admissions under Rule 36(b). Etah R. Civ. P. 36(bi. Instead, it is an action in

which the trial conn determined that the verbal agreement between party attorneys was
valid, and therefore the answers were nol due until such time as setllemeni negotiations

were terminated. Since plaintiff's answers were timely served when negotiations broke
down, they were not automatically deemed admitted under Rule 36(ai( 1). and not
conclusively established under Rule 30 ibi. Utah R. (dv. P. 36(an I i. ibi. Therefore, all
of the evidence presented regarding ihe relevant admissions was properly allowed at trial.

III.

The trial court properly determined defendant's misrepresentation of his
retirement account constituted a substantial change in circumstances, and
therefore, appropriately awarded plaintiff one-half of the additional
retirement disbursement.

In the present ease, the trial court determined that a substantial change in
circumstances had occurred in the reported financial circumstances oi ihe parlies, and thai
the former decree oi divorce was based on prev iously unreported income ol ihe
defendant. (R. 456-S.) Thai determination is to be presumed valid by this Court, and

should not be overturned absent a finding by this Court thai there is no n a\on<d>U ha\i.s
for the trial court's decision. Crookston v. I ire Ins. Exch.. S60 P.2d 957. 95s i Etah 1993)

i emphasis added).
In Moore v. Moore, this Court stated it ". . .will nol overturn a trial court's

modification oi a divorce decree absent a clear abuse ol ihscreiion or manitest injustice."

872 P.2d 1054, 1055 (Utah App. 1994). b'urther, in Moan v. Moon, the Supreme Court o
Utah staled that "Ihe determination of die trial court that there |has or has not) been a

substantial change of circumstances ... is presumed valid, and we review the ruling under
an abuse of discretion standard." M:u>n v. Moon. 973 P.2d 431. 437 i 1999). cert, denied.

982 P.2d 89 (Utah 1999).

A.

Plaintiff made a prima facie showing of a substantial change in
circumstances.

The threshold requirement for relief in a petition for modification oi a decree
.'cree

ol

divorce is a showing of a substantial change in circumstances of (he parties occurring
since the entry ol the decree and not contemplated in the decree itself. Toone v. Toone.

952 P.2d 112. I 14 (Utah App. 1998.. Hill v. Hill. 96<S P.2d 866. 869 (Utah App. 1998).
In this case, defendant experienced a substantial increase in his income after the• deer
decree

ol

divorce was entered. (R. 498. 521.1 Del". Ex. #6. Rplr. Tr. P. 86:16-24 (Jan. 14. 1999).

Delendant's representations regarding his income were material factors upon which
plaintiff relied tinring stipulation negotiations. (R. 521.) Rplr. Tr. P. 19:8-25. 20:1-1 2.
25:15-2 E The specific changes in defendant's income, namely Ihe possibilities {){'
receiving future disbursements into lis retirement account, were nol incorporated into tin
original decree due to defendant's misrepresentations. (R. 62-76.)

In order for a material change in circumstances to be contemplated in a divorce

decree (here must be evidence, preferably in the form of a provision within the decree
26

ilscll. that the trial court anticipated the specific change. Durlee v. Duriee. 796 P.2d 7 I5.
"16 (Utah App. 1990). There is no evidence in the decree itself which establishes the fact

that additional disbursements into defendant's retiremeiil account mav be loriheommg.
i R. 02-76.) Accordingly, plaintiff established a pinna laeie case {)\ a substantial change
m circumstances which allowed the trial court to consider modification.

B.

fraud was plead with adequate particularity.

Plaintiffs verified petition to modify states that during the contacts and

negotiations between the parties leading up lo the stipulated agreement, defendant
represented that he was not receiving anv disability income, that he was not covered by
anv policv w Inch would grant him anv disability income, that his application tor coverage
under a disability insurance program had been denied, and that he would not be receiving
disability income, i R. 88-9. i The petition claims thai as a result ol those representations.
plaintiff agreed to certain provisions pertaining to child support and alimony. i R. 58.)

Additionally, the petition lo modify asserts that at the time the parties were
discussing a resolution ol" their diflerences. delendanl represented that his retirement

program contained certainly nol more than SI4.000. and that there would be no further
deposits into that program, t R. ST7, i It hkew ise slates that based on those representations,
plaintiff agreed that defendant should be aw aided the retirement program, iR. 8™.)
The terms "fraud" and "misrepresentation" are often used simultaneously to mean
•ssentiallv

the same thinii. Sec Utah R. Civ. P. 00i bi(5). Rule 9 oi the Utah Rules oi

Civil Procedure requires thai the circumstances constituting all contentions ol fraud or
mistake be staled with particularity. Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b). Plaintiff certainly plead
misrepresentation, another lerm for fraud, and did so including the particular
circumstances which constituted such misrepresentation. (R. 87-9.)
On appeal, defendai t contends that plaintiff did not [dead fraud. However.
defendant staled in his mot on for partial summary judgment that it was the conieiuion oi

the plaintiff that defendant, through fraud or misrepresentation, obtained property which
should have been divided between t ic parties. (R. 265-6 (emphasis added).) If fraud was
not plead, it is indeed unusual for defendant to claim thai it was.

(-'•

lev idence produCjed_at_irial supported defendant's 1r;aid.

In order lo prevail oi a claim oi fraud, all the elements musl be established bv

clear and conv Hieing evidence. Cheever v. Schramm. 577 P.2d 951. 954 ( Etah 1978).

I hose elements include: I ) a representation; 2) concerning a presently existing material
Iact; 5) winch was false; 4i which the representor either (a) knew lo be false, ov (b) made

recklessly, knowing that lie had msi. fficient knowledge upon which to base such
representation; 5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to ad upon it; 6i that the

other parly, acling reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity; 7) did in fact refv upon it; 8)
and was Ihereby induced to act; 9i m Ids injury and damage. Pace v. Parrish. 247 P.2d
275 (Utah 1952).

.[ was established at trial thai defendant did. indeed, make representation"

concerning his retirement account. <R. 521.) Rplr. Tr. P 10:9-1 I. 14:21-24. 29:5-7.
82:1 1-12 (Jan. 14. I 999).

The v alue oi defendant's retirement account was a material fact

m determining the amount of child support and alimony. (R. 52 1. > Rptr. '1 r. P. 15:5-9.
The value of ihe retirement account reported bv defendant was between S I 2.000-

S 14.000. with no additional disbursements forthcoming. (R. 521.) Rptr. Tr. P. Eb 1-3.
8 1:1 5-23. d'hat representation turned out lo be false. The true value of' the account was
S60.767.59 S48.707.59 after early withdrawal. (R.521.) Rptr. dr. P. 86:16-24.
Delendant admitted at trial that he had been aware that his former employer held
annual board meetings in which it determined pension plan fund distributions based on
the previous year's income, and thai such hoard meetings were held in March or April,
but the results were nol known until June or July. (R.521.) Rplr. Tr. P. 108:1-19. d'he
decree ol div owe was entered in May. i R. 62-7*0. i Wherefore, ev en if delendant did nol
know the correct amount ol his retirement account at the time the decree was entered. at

die Ua\!. delendant represented the amount in his retircmenl account /•<•< kit \Wv. knowing
that he had insuflicient know ledge upon which to base such representation.

Defendant knew plaintiff was relying strictly on his representations concerning his
retirement account in order to make her decisions concerning child support and alimony.
12 1.) Rptr. IV. P. 17:5-19. 19: M-25. 20:1 -1 2. It was reasonable lor plaintiff to iely
oi

i defendant's representations as she was not inlormed concerning the couple's linances.

and delendanl claimed he would tell the truth, i R. 521. > Rplr. Tr. P. 9:7-1 1. I 7:1 5-10.

"•9

19:25. 20:1 -3. Plaintiff was induced lo act upon defendant's false and/or reckless
representations as manifested by the decree of divorce. (R. 62-76.1 To her detriment, she
was awaided far less child support end alimony. (R. 62-76.)
In Shelton v. Shelton. this Court, quoting Clissold v. Chssold. 519 P.2d 741. 242
(Utah 1974). stated:

[a| material misrepresentation or concealment oi assets or financial condition as a
result of which alimony (tr property awarded is less ov more than otherwise would
have been provided for is a proper ground for which the court may grant relief to
the parly who was offended by such misrepresentation or concealment, absent
other equities such as laches or negligence. . . However, before relief can be

granted, it must b determined that the alleged misrepresentation or concealment
constitutes conduct such as f-aud. as would basically afford the complaining partv
relief from the judgment. 885 P.2d 807. 808 (Utah App. 1994).
Here, the lads and evidence before the trial court certainly support a prima facie
show ing oi iviiud. fulfilling each express element. The court found that defendant had.

indeed, misrepresented his retirement account, and therefore, appropriately awarded
plaintiff one-half oi the true value.

IV.

The trial court properly awarded an additional $6,000 to plaintiff as alimony
due to delendant's receipt of disability income.

Before modifying an alimony award, the court must find a "substantial change in
circumstances not foreseeable at the time oi the | parties' | divorce." Utah Code Ann. ij
50-5-5(7 1(g)(1) ( 1999): see Throckmorton v. Throckmorton. 767 P.2d 121. 124 (Etah

App. 1988). In this case, there is nothing in the decree itself lo demonstrate lh;,l

disability income was contemplated by the parties, and therefore, it is nol considered
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foreseeable at the tune of divorce. ( R. 62- /b.)

Again, in Moon v. Moon, this Court stated that "(t]he determination oi the trial

coun that there |has or has not] been a substantial change of circumstances ... is presumed
valid." and the ruling is reviewed under an abuse oi discretion standard. 975 P.2d 45 1.
45" i 1999 i. cert, denied. 982 P.2d 89 (Utah 1999). Eurther. the Couvl mentioned that its

review ol the record showed that the trial court's ruling was supported bv the evidence.
hk at 458.

A.

The trial court's decision was clearly supported by the evidence.

Plaintill established a puma facie ease oi changed circumstances. Defendant
misrepresented the possibilities oi his receiving disability income. (R. 521.) Rptr. Tr. P.
10:9-1 I. 14:21-24. 19:1-5. 29:3-". SE18-25. 82:1 1-12 clan. 14. |999i. The record

contains testimony that defendant stated there was no possibility ol his receiving
disability income in the future. (R.521.) Rplr.d'r.P. 14:24-25. 15:1-10. Disability
income was a material consideration in determining the amount oi defendant's alimony
obligation, bmallv. disability income w as nol contemplated in the original decree, i R.
62-76.)

B.

IVlcndant's misrepresentation represented a compelhng reason to modify

Plaintill agrees that to hold that a change in circumstances can ov ercome a
stipulation in all cases...opens the door for abuse. Kinsman v. Kinsman. 748 P.2d 2 10.

2 I2 i Utah I9SS i. Plaintiff further agrees that, as stated in Epstein v. Epstein, "[cicjiutv is

not available lo reinstate rights and privileges voluntarily contracted away simply because
one has come to regret the bargain made." 741 P.2d 974. 976 ( Etah App. 1987)
Properly settlement agreements incorporated into stipulated decrees should, indeed, not
be modified absent compelling reasons. Eand v. 1.and. 605 \\2c\ 1248, 1251 (Utah 1980).
However, in this case, plaintiff was misled as to material fads, and therefore,\ dtim
not enter into the bargain knowingly. She did not ask the trial court to modify the

alimony amount simply because she had come to regret the bargain made. On the
contrary, a .substantial change in circumstances had occurred which included deceit on tht

part of defendant, ddiis represents a compelling reason to modify.
As slalea, in order lor this Court to overturn a trial court's modification of a

divorce decree, it must find that "the evidence clearlv preponderates against the findmes
or that the trial court has abused Us discretion." Thompson v. Thompson. 709 p.2d 360

362 (Utah 1985). This is unc|iieslionably nol the case here. Indeed, the evidence clearly

preponderates thai the finding oi the trial court concerning a change in circumstances as

pertaining lo alimony was v^ell-supporied. Wherefore, the trial court propeilv awarded an
additional S6.000 lo plaintiff as alimony due lo defendant's receipt of disability income.

V.

Ihe e\idence in the record supports the trial court's refusal to modify
delendant's alimony obligation.
The Nupieme Court of Utah has staled thai the criteria for dcterminine reasonal ->lc

alimony include the financial condition and needs of the wife, her ability ;o support
hersell. and the ability ol" the husband to provide support. Gramme v. (iramme. >X7 P.2d

144. 147 (Utah 1978). Trial courts have broad discretion in making aluuonv awards,
Haumont v. Haumont. 795 P.2d 421. 423 (Utah App, 1990). This Court has stated that it
will not upset a trial court's aw an! ol alimony so long as it is within the appropriate legal
landards. Johnson v. Johnson. 855 P.2d 250. 2:>2 i Etah App. 1995^ (.
.A.

Defendant tailed to prove plaintiff did not have need oi the amount oi
alunonv she was receiving, that she was able lo support herself, and thai he
did not have the ability to provide support.

I here is evidence which demonstrates plaintiffs need for alimony and her inability
lo support herself. She was attending school full-time, and was nol working, i R. 205.
52Ei Rptr. Tr. P. 40:25. 41:1-5 (Jan. 14. 1999i. She was recciv ing Pell Grants and help
from others in order to maintain herself and two minor children. ( R. 205. i She did not

hav e any assets Irom which to borrow money to support herself, i R. 521.) Rptr. Tr. P.

49:9-24. II delendant had paid the alimony of S 1.500 per month as required by the
divorce decree, plaintiff would nol have had need oi government or other assistance, and

could have properly supported herself and two children living with her. <R. 205. i
Delendant did not show his inability to provide support. .Although he claimed m

his amended petition to modify the decree i)i divorce that his gross monthly income was
S~.0()0. his financial declaration showed thai his gross income was s I 1.066.68 per month.
( R, 165. 22b. i I ven after deductions, defendant stated thai his monthly is S"554.05. and

Ins debts and obligations $4,700. iR. 225.) That leaves a surplus oi 52.834.05. In
addition, delendant testified thai at the time oi trial he w as makme ev en more than his

financial declaration had staled diw \o an increase in his practice. (R. 521.) Rptr. Tr. P.

97:1-19. dims, defendant did not present evidence lo show that he could nol meet the
alimony obligation.
13.

This Court should cnht findings consistent with the ev idence in the redia1
and with the conclusion of the trial court.

Plaintil f does not dispute the tact that the trial court's order does not include

specific findings as to the issue oi alimony. Nevertheless, this Court lias the power to
weigh ihe evidence and substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court. Wilson v.

Wilson. 296 P.2d 977. 98 1 11 hah I956). It can do so when it has some means ol" knowing
upon which lads ihe trial judge relied in entering his judgment. Montoya v. Montova.

696 P.2d 1193, I 195 (Utah 1985). dhe record must contain sufficient evidence to support
the trial judge's conclusions. Parish v. Parish. 55 P.2d 999. 1001 (Utah 1954).
As illustrated above, the record in this ease is clear. Therefore, in the inleres
.TCSl

Ol

judicial economy, (his Court should weigh the evidence and enter adequate findings based
on the inlormation in the record. Such findings sluuild include a determination that ihe
trial conn's refusal to modify defendant's alimony obligation was based on the financial
condition and needs of the plaintiff, her inability to support herself, and the ability of
defendant lo prov ide support.

VI.

The trial court's grant of a protective order to the Division of Occupational
and Professional Licensing did not aliect the outcome in this case.

Plaintil I docs nol refute that the motion lor a protective order was ruled upon
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belorc delendant was given an opportunity to reply. The motion was tiled on October 22.
1998. (R. 556-42.) The court, stating that defendant had failed to file anv persuasive
authority k^y reasons to set aside the protected status ol the Division's records, granted the
order on October 28. 1998. (R. 575-7. i This does not appear to be in compliance with
Rule 4-5011 I k B i which provides that a partv has ten davs from the date oi service ol a
motion to file a response. Etah R. .hid. Administration 4-5011 1x B i. Notw ithstandmg.
pkuntiff maintains that even if" defendant had been allowed to respond and had
remarkably convinced the trial court that the Bureau Manager from the state's
Department iA' Professional I .icensure ("the Div ision'T was not sheltered from testifying
concerning information designated as "protected." it would not have affected the trial
court's decision not to reduce defendant's alimony obligation.

A.

I he in formal ion w Inch could hav e been prov idcd bv the Div lsion would
hav e only helped delendant prove his threshold requirement ol a siibsiant
change in circumstances.

ddie information defendant w ished to obtain from the Div isi on was ev idence to

indicate that plaintiff had somehow sabotaged his efforts to obtain a license to practice
medicine in Utah. (R. 165. i I lad delendanl been able lo put on this ev idence. it would

have only helped lo establish a substantial change in circumstances winch occurred alter
the time ol the divorce.

B.

However, that is only a threshold issue.

Defendant failed to show plaintiff's lack oi need or ability lo support
1\erself. or that he was unable to prov ide support.

As mentioned abov e. the court must a No consider the linaneia! condition and

^s

needs of the wile, her ability to support herself, and ihe ability ol the husband to provide
support, (iramme v. Gramme. 587 P.2d 144. 147 (Utah 1978). To repeat, plaintiff
showed that she was attending school 1ull-time and receiving gov eminent assistance, i R
205.) She did not have any assets from which lo borrow money lo support herself. <R.

521.) Rplr. Tr. P. 40:9-24 (Jan. 14. 1999). Defendant had a gross monthly income in

excess of SI 1.606.68. (R. 226.521.) Rptr. Tr. P. 97:1-19. His debts and obligations

were $4,700. (R. 225.) He had the financial ability to pay alimony of $1,500 per monlh.
C.

The issuance ol" the protective order is a non-issue.

If procedure under Rule 4-501 ( 1 )(13) had been followed correctly, and soineh
.mow
the protective order had been denied, defendant would only have been able lo use ihe

Division's testimony to possibly establish the threshold Esue oi a substantial change' in
ii
circumstances. Then, even if established, that substantial change in circumstances would

not have been enough to modify alimony. Due to defendant's inability lo establish all of
the criteria necessary in order for a court to reduce his alimony obligation, it is
unimportant that the Protective order was not issued in accordance with Rule 450KIKB).

\ IE

There is no issue concerning defendant's motion for partial summary
judgment as the record is \oid of any e\ idence that a notice lo submit v\as
filed or that a judgment was ever entered by the court.

Rule 4-501 ( I)(D) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration requires thai a party
seeking a decision on a motion must file a "Notice to Submit for Decision." Utah R. Jud.
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Administration 4-501 (1 )(D). The rule further states that if neither party files a notice, the
motion will not be submitted for decision, hah (emphasis added).
In the present case, defendant did indeed file a motion for partial summary
judgment, which was then opposed by plaintiff. (R. 265-8. 272-6.) However, delendant

lailed to comply with Rule 4-501 ( 1)(D) by neglecting to file a notice to submit for
decision. There is no evidence in the record whatsoever that the trial court ever ruled on

this moiion. Eurtherrnorc, defendant admits that a written order was never entered.

Therefore, this Court has nothing to rely upon to support defendant's contention that his

motion for summary judgment was denied, and is accordingly not in a position to review
a decision that was never made.

VIII. The evidence in the record supports the trial court's award of attorney fees to
plaintiff.

Utah Code Ann. ij 50-5-5 (1995) grants trial courts the power to award attorney
fees in divorce actions. See Crouse v. Grouse. 817 P.2d 856. 840 (Utah App. 1991 ).
"Both the decision to award attorney fees and the amount of" such lees are within the
sound discretion oi the court." kk. Chambers v. Chambers. 840 P.2d 841. 844 ( Utah

App. 1992). The award, however, must he based on evidence of the receiving spouse's

financial need for attorney fees, the ability of the other spouse to pav. and the
reasonableness oi the requested award, hk There is evidence lo support each oi these in
within the record.

A.

The trial court's decision was based upon evidence in the record that

plaintiff had a financial need for attorney fees, that defendant had the ability
lo pay, and that the requested award was reasonable.
First, there is evidence which demonstrates plaintiff's financial need for an award

of attornev fees. At trial, plaintiff was asked if she had the funds to pay the legal fees she
had incurred as a result of these proceedings. (R. 521.) Rptr. Tr. P. 40:3-7 (Jan. 14,
1999). She answered that she did nol. (R.521.) Rptr. Tr. P. 40:8. She was not working
at all because she was attending school full-lime. (R. 521.) Rptr. Tr. P. 40:25.41:1-3.

She did not have any assets from which to borrow to pay attorney fees. (R. 52 1. i Rptr.
Tr. P. 40:9-24.

Second, there is evidence that defendant had the ability to pay attorney fees. His
gross income was in excess of $1 1,666.68 per month. (R. 226. 521.) Rptr. Tr. P. 97:1-

15. He stated in his financial declaration that his debts and obligations totaled $4,700.
(R.225.)

And third, the requested award is reasonable. Nothing is said in the record or in

any affidavit claiming that the fees requested were unreasonable in amount.
Ordinarily, when fees in a divorce were awarded below lo the party who then
prevails on appeal, fees will also be awarded to that parly on appeal. Hell v. Hell. 810

P.2d489, 494 (Utah App. 1991 ) (quoting Hurt v. Hurt. 799 P.2d 1166, 1171 (Utah App.
1990)). Plaintiff was awarded attorney fees below. (R. 486.) Upon her success in
responding to this appeal, she should likewise be awarded reasonable attorney fees wdiich
have resulted. Moore v. Moore. 872 P.2d 1054, 1056 (Utah App. 1994).
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B.

This Court should enter findings consistent with the evidence in the record
and with the conclusion oi the trial court.

Plaintiff does not dispute that the trial court's orderdoes not included specific
findings as to the issue of attorney fees. Notwithstanding, because there is ample
evidence in the record to enable this Court to discern upon which facts the trial judee
relied in entering his judgment, remand is not necessary. Wilson v. Wilson. 296 P.2d
977.981 (Utah 1956), Montova v. Montova. 696 P.2d 1193, 1195 (Utah 1985). Parish v.
Parish. 35 P.2d 999. 1001 (Utah 1934).

Again, in the interest of judicial economy, plaintiff asks this Court to weigh the
evidence and enter adequate findings based on the information in the record. Such
findings should include a determination that the trial court's award of attorney fees was

based on plaintiffs financial need for attorney fees, the ability of defendant to pav. and
the reasonableness oi the requested award.
CONCLUSION

for the foregoing reasons, plaintiff respectfully requests this Court to: la)
determine as adequate the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law with
respect to delendant's misrepresentations of his retirement account and disability income,

or. in the alternative, enter its own findings oi fact and conclusions of law consistent with

the trial court's decision and the evidence in the record: lb) enter appropriate findings oi
lad concerning the trial court's acceptance of plaintiff s answers to defendant's first

discovery request, its refusal to modify delendant's alimony obligation, and its award of
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attorney fees to plaintiff consistent with the trial court"s decisions and evidence in the

record: 2) uphold the trial court's acceptance of plaintiff s answers to defendant's first

discovery request: 3) uphold the trial court's award ofone-half ofdefendant's retirement
disbursement to plaintiff: 4) uphold the trial court's award of$6,000 alimony to plaintiff:
5) uphold the trial court's refusal to modify defendant's alimony obligation: 6) determine
that the trial court's issuance of the protective order is a non-issue; 7) determine that

defendant's argument concerning partial summary judgment is a non-issue: and 8) uphold
the trial court's award of attorney fees to plaintiff.

Dated this 5lh day of September. 2000.

Respectfully submitted.

/? /*>
<^_

Karl 11. Mueller
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following address:
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St. George. IT 84770
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